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Introduction
Official patient payments in health care were intro-
duced quite actively in different countries of Eastern Eu-
rope during the last decades. “Willingness to pay” was 
one of the principles in the development of the official 
patient payment policy [1] although willingness-to-pay 
was rarely measured for the purpose of designing official 
patient payment mechanisms. In Ukraine, where the con-
stitution proclaims free of charge medical care within the 
public sector, there is a very limited list of public health 
care services for which charges can be levied. Neverthe-
less, the idea to introduce a wider list of officially paid 
public health care services appeared several times in 
policy discussions at the State and city Kyiv levels. Pay-
ments for services in the public health care sector are also 
done by means of charities. In practice, this mechanism 
of payment is almost universal and compulsory. Such 
payments are actually a type of quasi-official payments 
for health care.
As a result, according to the National Health Ac-
counts, in 2007 in Ukraine, the total expenditure on the 
health care sector was 48 640 millions UAH (9632 mil-
lions US dollars), which is 6.8% of GDP. However, only 
55.7% of this expenditure are from public sources. In 
2008 and 2009, public expenditure was 56.1% and 54.4% 
of total health expenditure respectively, which is more 
or less the same as previous years [2, 3]. Thus, the share 
of private expenditure constituted around 43.9–45.6% of 
the total expenditure. Almost all of this money is spent 
by households on pharmaceuticals but it looks like these 
numbers include also the charity contributions. It is obvi-
ous, that the Ukrainian health care system, namely the 
provision of health care services, suffers from underfund-
ing from the government and that this deficit is partly 
made up by unofficial payments by patients.
The insufficient funding of the public health care sec-
tor results in informal patient payments for services [4]. 
While there are no reliable data about the scale of in-
formal patient payments, experts suggest that these pay-
ments are widespread. The situation with informal patient 
payments in the health care sector in Ukraine is dramatic 
and constitutes an impediment to equity and access to 
medical services in general. Unofficial patient payments 
create a barrier to generate funds for development of the 
health care system. A well-established system of unof-
ficial payments does not enable patients to plan their ex-
penditures, protect their rights in case of not getting care 
in time or when getting low quality care. These payments 
limit access to health care [4, 5]. The introduction of of-
ficial patient payments – i.e. a system with transparency 
about what patients need to pay and for which services 
and what they may expect in return for these payments 
– seems a rational solution as people pay for services 
anyway.
Despite that, the attitude of stakeholders toward offi-
cial patient payments has never been a subject of empiri-
cal research in Ukraine. In this study, we attempt to study 
these attitudes and based on this, to answer the question 
about the role and objectives of patient charges for health 
care services in Ukraine. Thus, this study can help to 
evaluate the perspectives of an introduction of official pa-
tient payments in Ukraine in the public health sector. For 
this purpose, we use results form focus group discussions 
with health care consumers and providers, and in-depth 
interviews with policy-experts in Ukraine. The data were 
collected in May–June 2009. Before outlining the results 
and discussing the findings, the paper first presents a de-
scription of the Ukrainian health care context.
Features of the Ukrainian health care system
The Ukrainian health care system emerged when the 
country obtained independence in 1991, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. It fully inherited the infrastructure, 
system of financing and organization from the Soviet 
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times. However, unlike other domains of the domestic 
economy, the health care system has remained practically 
unchanged preserving all the old principles of function-
ing, e.g. centralized planning and control, and officially 
free-of-charge service provision. Nevertheless, the system 
is characterized by unsustainable underfunding [1, 2], the 
existence of informal patient payments [4–9], an oversup-
ply of narrowly specialized medical staff, and a shortage of 
nursing personnel and general specialists (general practi-
tioners, family doctors) [11]. There is also a concern about 
heavy oversupply of hospital beds, which is mostly caused 
by input-based funding and, the financial incentives for 
hospital management to maintain the beds. Primary care 
and some special types of care, e.g. emergency, social, and 
maternity care, are rather unevenly distributed across ter-
ritories and do not meet care needs on average [13].
The capstone of the health care system in Ukraine 
is the clause 49 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which 
postulates some of its main principles: (1) health care 
is provided through public financing, which assures ef-
ficient and accessible medical aid for all citizens, (2) in 
State-owned and communal health care facilities, medi-
cal aid is provided free-of-charge, and (3) the existing 
network [auth.: for 1996] of health care facilities cannot 
be reduced [8, 14]. This limitation postulated by the Con-
stitutions is the main pretext for the failure of many of 
the reforms attempts – such as the failure hitherto to in-
troduce social health insurance or formal patient charges.
Organization of health care provision
Most of the medical and health care facilities in 
Ukraine remain publicly owned. They belong either to 
the national (State owned) or local authorities (communal 
owned regional, district, city institutions), or to the rural 
communities. At the same time, the private sector is still 
relatively small covering less than 2% of the population 
[13]. The network of public facilities is rather extended 
and it is related to the administrative-territorial division 
of Ukraine. There are basically three levels of subordina-
tion: national, regional, district and community. At na-
tional level, facilities are subordinate to the Ministry of 
Health of Ukraine. At this level, there are also so-called 
ministerial and departmental facilities that are subordi-
nated and financed by certain ministries (The Ministry 
of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security 
Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Transport), or depart-
ments and administrations. They provide parallel serv-
ices to their own employees and their families. Regional 
level facilities are subordinated to and financed by the 
regional and municipal administrations, though regional 
and municipal councils take part in budget allocation de-
cisions. Finally, district public health care facilities are 
subordinated to and financed by district, municipal, and 
even regional administrations, while communal facilities 
administratively belong to community councils, though 
some financing and regulation may be done by regional 
administrations. The State Department for the Peniten-
tiary System is responsible for organizing and providing 
health and preventive services within the penal system.
Such fragmented and to a certain extent, ambiguous 
hierarchy leads to regional, territorial and institutional 
inequalities in the location and state of the facilities. The 
ministerial and departmental facilities are usually better 
maintained and supplied than the rest. Access to these 
hospitals for “external” patients is hard but possible 
through informal payments. Rural areas mostly suffer 
from a shortage of facilities, supplies and specialists, and 
the state of these facilities in some regions is critically 
bad. There is a collision of responsibility when the health 
care posts in villages are financed by local councils, 
while they are subordinated to the central district hospi-
tals which, in their turn, are responsible for the popula-
tion health status on the territory.
The distinction of health care provision into primary 
secondary and tertiary levels in Ukraine is rather vague. 
There is no legislative definition of these levels of care. 
Some facilities and even specialists provide care at two 
or three of these levels at once. All medical staff in public 
facilities consists of public servants receiving fixed sala-
ries. This means a lack of formal incentives to improve 
efficiency and quality of health care provided. 
One of the most pressing problems at present is the 
underdeveloped primary health care and the concentra-
tion of physicians at the secondary and tertiary levels of 
care. The primary health care system is represented by 
the district physicians in policlinics, work related clinics, 
women’s consultation clinics, rural “family” ambulato-
ries, outpatient departments in rural hospitals, and feld-
sher-obstetrician centers. The specialists from the central 
regional hospitals control their colleagues at the district 
levels. District physicians, namely district pediatricians, 
district internists or family doctors, are Ukrainian ana-
logues of general practitioners in their catchment areas 
– districts. A rural physician’s catchment area contains on 
average four to five feldsher-obstetrician posts or “fam-
ily” ambulatories that provide simple curative services, 
first aid, prescription of drugs, antenatal and postnatal 
care as well as basic preventive activities such as immu-
nization. Some primary facilities or even feldsher-obste-
trician posts may have inpatient beds. The gate-keeping 
role of the primary care system is often neglected as there 
is the possibility for patients, though informal, to have 
direct access to a medical specialist and bypassing the 
primary contact with a district physician. Secondary and 
sometimes tertiary care is provided at policlinics, outpa-
tient departments of hospitals, and dispensaries. In rural 
areas, secondary care is usually concentrated at a district 
level. Tertiary care is provided mainly in district hospitals 
and dispensaries.
The wide network of primary health care facilities in 
the cities contrasts with problems of access in the vil-
lages resulting from the inefficient location of facilities in 
rural areas and the absence of own transport or working 
capital in the rural medical facilities. The funding of ru-
ral facilities and practices is done on an input basis from 
the budget of the respective level. The poor state of rural 
facilities is mostly explained by the small budgets of vil-
lages and towns.
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Health care system funding
The Ukrainian public health care sector is officially 
financed by public funds through the general taxation 
system. A very small part of the government expenditure 
on health (around 0.8%) is administered through social 
insurance funds (SFI) (e.g. SFI against Temporal Disabil-
ity and Costs Caused by Births and Funerals, SFI against 
Occupational Accidents and Occupational Diseases, 
and Fund for Social Protection of the Disabled), which 
cover special cases of occupational trauma or disorder, 
reimburse sick or maternity leaves, and cover treatment 
in health resorts for insured [13]. Insurance premiums to 
these funds are salary based and distributed between em-
ployers and employees. Despite declared public financ-
ing, private expenditures make up a substantial part of 
total health expenditure in Ukraine. As was mentioned 
before, by the methodology of WHO National Health Ac-
counts, 43.9% of total health expenditures were private in 
2008, with most of this (92.6%) being out-of-pocket [2]. 
Similar statistics can be seen in OECD Health Data [3].
Medical facilities and executors of national and local 
health care programs receive funding from the State and 
local budgets on an input basis (hospital beds, specialists, 
laboratories, departments etc.). This is done by means of 
a strict line-item budget approved by local and national 
administrations or councils depending on the facility be-
longing. Medical facilities have little autonomy in funds 
distribution and each deviation from the budget can be 
passed only through decision of the respective adminis-
tration or council.
Although the Constitution prohibits the existence of 
the official patient payments, the legislative field related 
to the existence of such payments is controversial. “The 
legal basis of health care” from 1992 [15] followed by 
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers from 1996 [16] 
(the decree is still in force) allow State-owned and com-
munal facilities to charge fees for medical services. The 
Constitutional Court limited this permission to charge 
fees (given by the abovementioned legislation) to some 
specific services (e.g. medical examinations for driver’s 
license, weapon carrying permission, permission for 
trips abroad) and also allowed charging fees for so-called 
“paramedical services”, although no list of such services 
exists. From the Soviet times, it is still possible to receive 
paid anonymous treatment for addictions and to receive 
paid dental services [17, 18]. Foreign citizens are also 
officially charged for the health care services they receive 
in Ukraine [19, 20].
Thus, in a very limited number of cases official pa-
tient charges do exist. They are even the main source of 
income of “self-financing” public facilities such as dental 
clinics. Furthermore, some facilities establish their own 
“official” price-lists which are sometimes supported by 
decrees of local administrations. However, this latter case 
is broadly discussed and seen as violating the Constitution.
As was mentioned before, the legal sources of addi-
tional income for the public facilities are charitable con-
tributions and donations to the health care facilities. They 
are regulated by the process of giving and receiving 
charitable (voluntary) contributions and donations from 
persons and legal entities to public institutions as defined 
by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers and The Law 
of Ukraine “On Charity and Charitable Activities” [21, 
22]. However, “charitable contributions” at some period 
of time became obligatory or at least common (i.e. semi-
legal/quasi-official) and a way of gathering patient pay-
ments from the Ukrainian population.
Despite the constitutional guarantee, there is much 
non-academic evidence about informal patient pay-
ments. The academic literature does not offer reliable 
data on the volume of the informal sector in Ukrainian 
health care. However, some studies provide evidence of 
their existence [4–9]. Preliminary studies have shown 
that patients have to purchase practically all pharmaceuti-
cals themselves in the market or from the physicians. The 
practice of “thanking” doctors with money, or sometimes 
in kind, is very common. The same is true for the health 
services.
For example, empirical evidence indicates that the 
Odessa population spent out-of-pocket 20 million US 
dollars on out-patient and in-patient treatment during 
a period of 12 months in 1999–2000. This amount was 
twice higher than the total city budget for health care 
during that period. A study conducted in Lviv in 1995 
among private and public doctors (N = 325) regarding 
their honoraria, shows that private spending for medical 
care was around 2.5 million US dollars. As much as 90% 
of this amount was paid informally to physicians in the 
public sector [6, 7]. 
The results of a study conducted in 2001 in 8 former-
USSR countries demonstrate that around 30% of respond-
ents in Ukraine pay informally at the medical settings [8]. 
Qualitative research conducted at Kyiv maternity houses 
shows that up to 90–95% of income of obstetricians – 
gynecologists in 2008 consisted of informal patient pay-
ments for deliveries of babies. Usually, income of physi-
cians was not less than 20 000 UAH per month while the 
official salary is not higher than 1500 UAH per month 
[9]. The data of a household survey conducted in Octo-
ber 2009 in Ukraine show that almost 84% of households 
reported that a member of their household could not see 
a physician, and more than 98% could not get medical 
procedures or treatment at the in-patient clinics because 
of high costs of care [5].
The future of the reform process
Ukraine has experienced many attempts to reform 
its health care system. Each new Minister of Health has 
tried to reform the Ukrainian health care system. Since 
1991 (during the 19 years after Ukraine have obtained its 
independence), there were 14 Ministers of Health. This 
means that each minister stayed on their post for about 
1 year. This did not ensure a consistent and continuous 
development of the sector. The latest attempt to reform 
the Ukrainian health care system is the Regulation of the 
Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine from February 17 2010 
# 208. According to the “Regulation” there is a plan to 
split primary and secondary health care. It is proposed to 
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create Centers of Primary Health, General Hospitals with 
urgent care, rehabilitation, palliative care, social care, and 
diagnostics. It is also planned to reorganize emergency/
acute care, and to create University Clinics. Centers of 
Primary Health should be based on the health needs of 
the population. Vinnytskiy and Dnipropetrovskiy regions 
are two pilot regions; the pilot will start on January, 1, 
2011 [23].
The current president of Ukraine has stated that the 
reforms in the public health care sector should be central 
although each previous president has stated the same. 
The current president promised that a new regulatory 
base will be presented to the Parliament soon. He also 
stressed the necessity to solve the problem of roads in 
Ukraine in order to provide adequate care in case of 
emergency. The new idea for structural reforms is to cre-
ate so-called “hospital areas”. This idea is derived from 
the understanding that at the same street of the regional 
city, two hospitals with the same departments can exist: 
of regional and city subordination. Previously the idea to 
eliminate this inefficiency was called “creation of unified 
medical environment”. The president has also promised 
to raise the salaries of the medical professionals and con-
trol the situation in maternal and child care [24].
Methods
Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were 
carried out in Ukraine in May–June 2009. Their objec-
tive was to study the opinion and attitudes towards pa-
tient payments and to identify criteria important for the 
assessment of patient payment policies. On the whole, 
four target groups were considered: health care consum-
ers (including working individuals, families with chil-
dren, pensioners, students, disabled and chronically sick 
individuals and individuals living in rural areas); health 
care providers (including primary care providers, out-
patient specialists, physicians and nurses in city hospi-
tals, primary care providers practicing in rural areas and 
physicians in district hospitals), health insurance experts 
(including experts from government and independent or-
ganisations), and health policy makers (including health 
policy-makers at national and regional level, and finan-
cial policy-makers at national level). 
Data among health care consumers and providers 
were collected via focus group discussions. Since these 
target groups are rather large and diverse, focus groups 
discussions allowed the inclusion of more individu-
als. Nevertheless, the objective was to assure a certain 
level of homogeneity of each focus group in order to 
reach a consensus during the discussion. In total, 10 fo-
cus group discussions were carried out: 6 focus groups 
with consumers and 4 focus groups with health care 
providers. On average, each focus group included 8 par-
ticipants. It was not possible to organize focus group dis-
cussions with primary care providers practicing in rural 
areas and with physicians in district hospitals, because of 
distances and busy time-schedules of these health care 
providers. Therefore, these focus group discussions were 
replaced with in-depth interviews with 6 respondents. 
Data among policy-makers and health insurance ex-
perts were collected via face-to-face semi-structured in-
depth interviews. This choice of data-collection method 
was based on the fact that these target groups are rela-
tively small and moreover, they might feel more comfort-
able to express their opinion if contacted individually. In 
total, 5 in-depth interviews were carried out with policy-
makers and 5 in-depth interviews with health insurance 
experts.
For the purpose of the focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews, a list with key questions was devel-
oped based on a preliminary literature review. The same 
key questions were used for all target groups with slight 
modifications to reflect the specificity of a given target 
group. The key questions were used to develop guides 
for focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, as 
well as a standardised questionnaire to collect additional 
quantitative data on the topic. The following issues were 
discussed: (1) opinions about the objectives and design 
of patient payments, (2) criteria for the assessment of 
patient payment policies, (3) the relation between formal 
and informal patient payments. Additionally, we asked all 
respondents to fill in self-administrated questionnaires at 
the end of individual or focus-group discussions. 
We observed that only 2–3 persons participated ac-
tively during focus-group discussions, thus, their opinions 
prevail in case of group discussion. It was a good solu-
tion to apply self-administrated questionnaires at the end 
of the discussions as we could thereby register the opinion 
of all participants without group pressure. The results of 
focus groups discussions and of self-administrated ques-
tionnaires were different: the opinions of the respondents 
were more radical when expressed in self-administrated 
questionnaire anonymously.
Results
Official patient payment is an absolutely new topic 
for discussion with the Ukrainian population. As it is ob-
served in the study, attitudes towards informal payments 
and the introduction of health insurance are already 
formed in contrast to attitudes towards official patient 
payments and their characteristics. 
Formal and informal patient payments
We ask the opinion of respondents whether the in-
troduction of official payments can replace informal 
payments. All groups of respondents believe that official 
patient payments have to replace informal patient pay-
ments. However, opinions of respondents are at variance. 
Although some respondents believe that the introduction 
of official patient payments would reduce the portion 
of unofficial payments, most representatives of the four 
groups believe that two types of payments would co-exist 
at first. Some of the interviewed indicate that it is im-
possible to eliminate completely the unofficial payments 
by introducing the official ones. The positive effects of 
introducing the official payments are diminished when 
informal payments exist.
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The consumers of health care services (more inten-
sively than other groups) argue that the introduction of 
official patient payments would impose an additional 
burden on patients since they would have to pay twice. In 
case of the introduction of such payments without other 
actions (e.g. increasing salaries of health care staff, im-
proving quality of services) the reasons for the under-the-
-table payments will remain: to motivate the staff and to 
obtain essential medical treatment. Some of the consum-
ers also expressed their idea that it is more convenient 
for them to pay into the pocket of their physicians, even 
if there is a possibility to pay at the cash-desk officially. 
One respondent observes: in that way the physician gets 
a higher income and the patient pays less. 
Further, the attitude towards informal payments de-
pends on the type of payment whether it is “a bribe” or 
“gratitude”. Most of interviewees understand “gratuity” 
to mean a voluntary payment to the physicians after the 
treatment, while “a bribe” is a payment which a physician 
requests before the treatment. Thus, some of the health 
care consumers believe that “gratitude” payment should 
be able to exist. Patients explain that the physician and 
the patient establish relationships that go beyond the 
official ones, which in turn provide the patient with an 
opportunity to get a consultation with a private call, and 
receive a service or a consultation after the physician’s 
official working hours. Nevertheless, some patients 
and medical staff do not feel comfortable when cash or 
presents are given unofficially. 
Some interesting ideas were expressed by the repre-
sentatives of policy-makers such as that the State is un-
able to offer higher official salaries for physicians. Thus, 
informal payments contribute to an adequate income for 
medical staff. Besides, by informal payments patients can 
receive higher quality services, which are not provided 
by the State.
While discussing informal payments with groups of 
health care providers, the topic of investments in health 
care facilities appeared. Representatives of medical 
staff argue that polyclinics and hospitals do not have 
proper funding, which results in out-of-order equip-
ment, absence of consumables, and lamentable state 
of buildings. Despite the fact that physicians buy some 
consumables using the money they earn, informally, they 
cannot afford renovation of equipment or rooms. Also, it 
is known from experience that at the peripheral level of 
health care, the staff sometimes spend their earnings for 
renovation and equipment and even renovate their wards 
themselves. Thus, if official patient payments increase 
the health care budget, policlinics and hospitals would 
have consumables and equipment.
Role and objectives of patient charges in Ukraine
Most respondents are positive about the introduc-
tion of official payments, arguing that (1) anyway health 
care services are de facto paid, (2) they would avoid 
overspending since they can estimate their capabilities 
according to a price-list, (3) official payments would 
make physician-client relations legitimate, thus, patients 
would be able to claim their rights and physicians would 
be more responsible. However, a few respondents espe-
cially from rural areas are extremely negative about the 
possibility of introducing official payments. Besides, all 
groups are quite pessimistic regarding the possibility of 
introducing such payments due to the lack of a legislative 
base for this type of reform.
With regard to the lack of funds in health care, we 
expect to hear from all groups of respondents that “gen-
erating additional resources” for the health care system 
of Ukraine has to be one of the main goals of official 
payments. Thus, consumers and service providers note 
the importance of giving health care facilities the right 
to generate additional resources. Insurance experts and 
consumers as well emphasise “the control on the health 
expenses” role. All policy-makers-respondents, almost 
all the insurance-experts-respondents, nearly half of the 
service providers as well as consumers claim that the 
payments should go to the health care facilities which 
provided the service.
Policy-makers in our study also point out that the 
goal should be to reduce unnecessary consumption of 
the health care services, complaining that there is an ex-
cess demand for health care services especially by senior 
people, retired people, and young mothers. However, one 
of the respondents expressed the opposite idea that “un-
necessary use of health care services” is not relevant to 
Ukraine since people even avoid visiting physicians be-
cause of high price of the services. Apparently, this repre-
sentative of the authorities was referring to the unofficial 
patient payments.
It is certainly clear that the service providers stress 
the need to increase the income of separate service pro-
viders. Nevertheless, the issue of providers’ income does 
not seem very relevant to patients. Thus, health care 
consumers-respondents stress the need to handle the un-
official payments as one of the important goals of the 
official patient payments. They also underline the need to 
improve the quality of services and to improve the moti-
vation of the health care workers.
Scope of level patient charges 
All groups of respondents express the common idea 
that a certain part of the basic services should be provid-
ed by the State free-of-charge. Emergency care, primary 
care, and the minimal level of medical assistance at the 
in-patient facilities should be included in the list of free 
services. 
All interviewed argue that “minimal scope of health 
care services” for in-patient should be provided free-of-
-charge by the State. In addition, most of the respondents 
note that examinations, dental care, and “hotel services” 
(additional comfort) should be charged for. Moreover, 
during the focus-group discussions respondents state that 
emergency care, even dental nature, have to be free-of-
charge. Taking into account opinions expressed in the 
self-administrated questionnaires all four groups of re-
spondents indicate that dental, out-patient, and in-patient 
services can be charged for. All respondents, except the 
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policy-makers and half of the providers, believe that first 
aid should stay free-of-charge. 
When we ask respondents about the types of patient 
payments that should be introduced, none of the respond-
ents have a specific and well-defined opinion. This is 
mainly because the existing approaches are not clear to 
them or are difficult for them to understand. Still, policy-
makers and insurance-interviewee appeal to co-payments 
and co-insurance more often. The same situation is ob-
served with regards to limits on official payments. Al-
though we described the possibilities of limits, it seems 
that respondents are faced with such concepts for the first 
time. With regard to the possibilities of misunderstand-
ing, consumers prefer to limit payments on the basis of 
the number of visits. Policy-makers suggest using the 
amounts of payments as limits, while every visit has to 
be paid for, otherwise, the high demand for the health 
care services would take place. 
We asked the respondents to indicate the specific 
amounts that patients have to pay for health care servic-
es. Despite the fact that most of the respondents think it is 
problematic to state the price for different services, some 
of the interviewees appeal to prices in private facilities 
when referring to the prices for public ones: “…less than 
in the private clinics but higher than the current ones in 
the public clinics”. Policy-makers mention that the prices 
for the health care services have to be formed with regard 
to an average salary of people in Ukraine. 
For those providers who indicate exact prices, 20–140 
UAH sounds reasonable to charge for the visit to the pri-
mary level physician, 100 UAH for one day of in-patient 
care. The opinions of the consumers varied more than 
that. The pensioners and the urban residents suppose 
that the price for a visit (or examination) of a primary 
level physician should range from 50 to 500 UAH, fami-
lies with children mention amounts like 50–100 UAH, 
students and unemployed citizens indicate 10–15 UAH 
and 6–20 UAH respectively. Additionally, the consum-
ers mention that the out-patient services can cost from 
5 to 100 UAH, complicated cases 250 UAH. The cost of 
treatment in an in-patient facility is estimated to range 
from 20 to 200 UAH. Only the pensioners say about 
500–1000, supposedly based on their own experience. 
Almost all respondents believe that emergency first aid 
should be free-of-charge.
All respondents support the idea that more expensive 
services or services of higher quality have to be more 
expensive for consumers. The representatives of authori-
ties stress the need to introduce a certain methodology of 
setting up payments for services and providing the differ-
ences in different health care establishments: 
Concerns about equity
Health care consumers in our study believe that all 
representatives of vulnerable population groups should 
be exempted from official patient payments. However, 
respondents are concerned about the proportion of such 
population group in the society, because (1) it could ap-
pear that 80 % of population are exempted; and (2) peo-
ple should be interested in financial independence from 
the State, and thus, not to be included in the low-income 
group.
Similarly, the representatives of policy-makers are 
cautious in their attitudes to such a group in the popula-
tion as “people with low income”. However, they recom-
mend paying attention to patients’ expenses since official 
income may form only a small part of the individual’s 
income. Policy-makers-respondents are more reserved on 
the issue of exempting chronically ill people from pay-
ing for services since there are a lot of different types 
of chronic diseases. According to their opinion, there 
should be a list of chronic diseases that would provide 
a person with an exemption of payment for the health 
care services. Moreover, it was a common believe for the 
policy-makers interviewed that representatives of vulner-
able groups have different levels of income. Therefore, it 
is not necessary to have all of them exempted from offi-
cial payments. Additionally, on the one hand, taking into 
account the demographic situation in Ukraine, pregnant 
women and children should be protected by the State. On 
the other hand, such population groups have also differ-
ent levels of income. Thus, according to policy-makers, 
it would not be right to exempt these groups completely 
from the payment for services.
Some health care providers whom we interviewed 
argue that pensioners, children under 14 years, disa-
bled people, and people suffering from chronic diseases 
should pay at least some part of the service costs. 
Some other population groups that could be exempted 
from paying are added: (1) women, who are on maternity 
leave, (2) the members of families with many children, 
(3) people, who were injured when performing their pro-
fessional duties at work, including the workers of the nu-
clear power plants. There are also ideas that the services 
related to the diagnostics and treatment of the socially 
dangerous diseases, for example, tuberculosis, AIDS, 
prevention of HIV infection and other sexually transmit-
ted diseases should be free-of-charge.
Overall, almost all respondents believe that disabled 
people must belong to the group of people exempted or 
partly exempted from paying for service. All respond-
ents, except health insurance experts, note that pregnant 
women should also belong to the exempted group. All 
respondents, except consumers, believe that this group 
should include children. All respondents, except policy-
makers, would restrict the payment for health care serv-
ices for the people with low income. Health care con-
sumers and some of the providers, policy-makers and 
insurance experts would include chronically ill people 
into the exempted group. Providers and insurance experts 
also named senior people. Policy-makers do not believe 
that there should be restrictions for people with low in-
come and elderly people. 
Discussion and conclusions
This article addresses the perspectives on the intro-
duction of official patient payments in Ukraine. As the 
Ukrainian public health care system is in general under-
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funded, de facto, people pay informally for public health 
services. The scale of informal and quasi-official charges 
is significant, and private expenditures make up nearly 
half of the total expenditure on health care, although 
household spending on health care is mostly on medi-
cines. Public expenditures cover expenses for salaries 
of medical personnel and utilities at the health institu-
tions. It is worth mentioning that quasi-official payments 
done by people as charitable (voluntary) contributions 
cannot be used for the remuneration of medical staff, e.g. 
spent on salaries. 
Thus, it is not surprising that almost all respondents 
expressed the opinion that official payments in Ukraine 
are necessary as a method of financing the health care. 
As all respondents believe, this would enable attracting 
additional resources for the health care sector. However, 
as is known from the literature, when official payments 
are introduced they frequently do not generate more than 
15% of total resources [25–27]. The reasons for that are 
the administrative expenses, low cost of the services, free 
of charge services for the vulnerable groups of people, 
and the unwillingness of patients to pay. The amount of 
money received by the health care system depends on 
the: (1) mechanisms of payments; (2) willingness to pay; 
(3) the market of the private services; (4) possibilities to 
receive additional insurance [26–28]. 
Some critical remarks and negative attitudes to the 
introduction of official patient payments expressed by re-
spondents, could be explained by the fact that there have 
been no real health care reforms in Ukraine either in the 
organization or in the financing of health care since the 
Soviet times. In our study, respondents note that besides 
the introduction of official patient payments, it would be 
essential to have significant additional public funding of 
health care. A lot of respondents consider the introduction 
of social health insurance necessary. It will also be im-
portant to determine the list of free services together with 
the introduction of official payments. A similar system 
exists in Kyrgyzstan [29].
The expectations of policy-makers regarding the 
reduction of overuse of services by introducing official 
payments is justified, since empirical findings demon-
strate that the consumption of the health care services re-
duces after official payments are introduced [e.g. 30–40]. 
However, this raises the issue of access to health care 
and equity since official patient payments could be an 
additional burden for households. This kind of burden on 
households was observed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
and resulted in the non-use of medical services because 
of the inability to pay [29, 31]. In our study, respondents 
from rural areas were especially concerned about the pos-
sibility to get medical assistance once official charges are 
introduced. 
A study on the behavior of health care consumers 
and how out-of-pocket payments influence this behav-
ior, took place in 2000 in Georgia [32]. As a result, it 
was found that patient payments create financial barriers 
to health care services. Additionally, poorer households 
seem to seek health care less frequently than households 
with higher income. Consequently, recommendations to 
the government were composed including as a key mes-
sage: funding of services for the poor is the priority for 
the government; introduce pre-paid out-of-pocket pay-
ments on the basis of communities in order to reduce risk 
and financial pressures on households. 
If the goal of the official patient payment policy is to 
provide physicians with the right to attract additional re-
sources, then the establishment that provides the services 
should be the recipient of official payments. This opinion 
was expressed by Ukrainian stakeholders in our study. 
This is supported by the literature as well. The income 
from official payments to separate institutions of health 
care in the countries where the health care systems are 
disorganised, provides encouraging results since health 
care services could be renewed [30–41]. The patients are 
more willing to pay some, although not large, amounts 
for services with better quality [42–44]. 
An important policy goal of official patient payments 
is to phase out the unofficial patient payments. This is 
particularly stressed by the health care consumers in our 
study. Nevertheless, the opinions of the respondents were 
ambivalent or even paradoxical at times. For example, the 
representatives of the authorities believed that it would 
be impossible to provide the physicians with a decent in-
come when the informal payments are phased out. They 
supported the unofficial payments as a means to provide 
for the quality of services, and some patients mentioned 
the advantages of unofficial payments in motivating the 
doctors. A situation like this is evidence of the collapse of 
the health care system, caused by the absence of the trans-
formation process, and the need of creating an opposition 
towards informal patient payments among policy-makers 
as well, in addition to an overall social opposition.
Maryna Bazylevych [45] states that “the officials who 
have found a lucrative niche” are resistant to reforms as 
well as medical doctors who “established their clientele 
and receive regular informal income at cost of the State, 
which provides free room and board for patients, free 
utilities, and labor of the supporting staff”. Experts say 
that for the last two decades, the processes of self-organ-
ization and quasi-privatization are dominant in the health 
care system in Ukraine [46, 47]. Anyway, in our study, 
even officials told us stories how they or their relatives, 
colleagues who occupied high positions in Ukrainian 
health care system suffer when they become clients of 
the Ukrainian health system. Most of them believe that 
official payments for services are a good approach and 
could help to establish a kind of order in the deteriorated 
system of public health. It is worthy to mention that if 
doctors could be well-paid most of them would not take 
money from their clients [46].
The regulatory basis in Ukraine is not supportive for 
introducing official patient payments. As was mentioned 
above, several attempts to implement a wider list of paid 
services (either on the State or on city Kyiv level) failed 
although this study shows quite strong support for patient 
payments among different population groups including 
policy-makers. The difficulties in changing the legal 
frame could also be explained by the need of politicians 
to get “political dividends”: to show their “love and care” 
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for people. In their eyes, the introduction of patient pay-
ments seems to be an unpopular approach.
Should official patient payments be introduced, ex-
emption for “people with low income”, “chronically ill”, 
“seniors” should be well defined to meet criteria for re-
duced fees or no fees at all in order to prevent consider-
able equity deterioration. It could be especially problem-
atic if policy-makers do not consider low-income groups 
as a group that needs to be exempted (as indicated by 
our results). It is also an issue for Ukraine to define the 
groups that are considered to be those who suffered from 
the Chernobyl disaster. Overall, the designs of payments 
for services are based upon some values or are “clini-
cally sensitive”: a certain list of services and restrictions 
are usually introduced. According to the Bulgarian ex-
perience, chronically ill people, miners, unemployed, 
conscripts, war veterans, disabled, persons under arrest 
or imprisoned, and persons with zero and low income 
are exempted [48]; in Kyrgyz Republic unemployed, 
children under 16 and pensioners were exempted [29]. 
Moreover, patients demonstrate high support of broader 
exemption system in Bulgaria [48].
All respondents in our study, except the policy-
makers, believed that the primary health care should be 
free of charge, but not all of them think that emergency 
services should be free of charge. Positions like that are 
dangerous with regards to their consequences for the 
health of the population. Taking into account the interna-
tional experience, typical services that are free of charge 
include maternity care, prevention activities, emergency, 
in-patient care in case of life-threatening diseases. There 
was also some advocacy for abolishing the payments for 
the services of the primary medical-sanitary care [49]. 
For instance, in Kyrgyzstan primary health care patients’ 
spending was not covered by the State initially. However, 
in a few years the State has assumed such obligation. 
Nevertheless, informal patient payments increased [29].
At the same time, it is interesting that before the intro-
duction of official patient payments in Bulgaria in 2000, 
results from studies suggested that patients accepted pay-
ments for primary and dentist care in contrast to hospital 
care. Respondents were willing to pay for health services 
in public facilities if these services are provided with ap-
propriate quality and fast access [44]. It appears from our 
study that Ukrainians might also be willing to pay for 
the services of higher quality and for fast access to care. 
Our respondents especially stressed the issue of quality 
of health care and the role of professional associations in 
establishing them. Nevertheless, higher charges for bet-
ter quality can be only acceptable if the quality refers to 
luxury aspects of care. Life-saving and essential health 
care services should be provided with an adequate quality 
to all users. 
Thus, when talking about the perspectives, the need 
for legalising patient payments, as well as a need for 
changes in financing the health care system and paying 
for the labour of those involved in it – it is all perceived 
and realised as something urgent. On the other hand, all 
these processes are not seen to take place in the nearest 
future. The priority goals of introduction of the official 
patient payments in Ukraine are: attracting additional 
resources to the health care sector, especially to some 
particular institutions, increase in salaries of the service 
providers in a legal way for the patients, but with time 
these payments can eliminate the unofficial ones and 
“revitalise” the health care system. The policy and the 
design of the official patients’ payments have to take into 
account the equality/fairness, social acceptability and the 
system of financing the health care sector in general. The 
reduction in unofficial patient payments and unreason-
able consumption of services, attraction of additional 
resources, health indicators can be seen as the criteria for 
evaluating the system of official patent payments.
The principles of patient payments policy in Ukraine 
should be determined by the list of paid or free of charge 
services, the level/ amounts of payments for different 
services, exempted groups. The patient payments policy 
should be based, first of all on the level of income, and 
mechanisms of payments. Local peculiarities should be 
taken into account. Thus, many regulative and organiza-
tional changes should be done followed by deep analyti-
cal work.
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Abstract:
The attitudes of health care system stakeholders towards official pa-
tient charges have not been studied in Ukraine although both the central 
and local governments have several times considered to introduce such 
charges. Instead, informal patient payments are widespread and well-
established. Ukrainian patients pay either unofficially or quasi-officially 
(i.e. charitable contributions) to health care institutions. The reasonable 
solution for dealing with these types of payments would be the introduc-
tion of official patient charges. However, the legal base for such reform 
in Ukraine is ambiguous. The Constitution declares that health care pro-
vision is free-of-charge. Nevertheless, in our study, representatives of 
stakeholders groups appear keen not only on discussing official charges 
but are also favor their introduction. The expectations regarding the pos-
sible objectives of these charges expressed by different stakeholders are 
the focus of this paper. 
Streszczenie:
Stosunek do dopłat pacjentów na Ukrainie: czy jest miejsce 
na oficjalne opłaty pacjentów?
Słowa kluczowe: oficjalne dopłaty pacjentów, ukraiński system 
opieki zdrowotnej, nieoficjalne opłaty pacjentów
Stosunek uczestników systemu opieki zdrowotnej do oficjalnych opłat 
pacjentów na Ukrainie nie był do tej przedmiotem badań, chociaż rząd 
i samorządy lokalne wiele razy rozważały wprowadzenie takich opłat. 
Zamiast tego nieformalne opłaty pacjentów są powszechne i ogólnie 
przyjęte. Pacjenci na Ukrainie płacą nieoficjalnie albo quasi-oficjalnie 
(dobroczynne datki) placówkom opieki zdrowotnej. Rozsądnym rozwią-
zaniem w celu uporania się z tego typu opłatami mogłoby być wprowa-
dzenie oficjalnych dopłat pacjentów. Jednakże brakuje jasnej podstawy 
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prawnej do wprowadzenia takiej reformy. Zapisy konstytucji stanowią 
bowiem, że korzystanie z usług zdrowotnych na Ukrainie jest nieodpłat-
ne. Niemniej jednak uczestniczący w badaniu przedstawiciele różnych 
grup uczestników systemu opieki zdrowotnej byli chętni nie tylko do 
dyskusji na temat oficjalnych opłat, ale także byli zwolennikami ich wpro-
wadzenia. Oczekiwania względem prawdopodobnych celów takich dopłat 
wyrażane przez poszczególne grupy udziałowców są tematem niniejszego 
artykułu. 
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